Showing posts with label Femininity. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Femininity. Show all posts

Thursday, February 6, 2014

Gender Roles and Depression


Gender and Depression: How Structural Influences and Gender Stereotypes Affect Depression Rates
by Cassidy Clark and Rachael Van Pelt
            According to The Encyclopedia of Women in Today’s World, women are twice as likely as men to experience depression sometime in their lives, at a rate of one in four women (Bueskens 2011).  The reasons behind this significant disparity are debated: popular understandings of depression in Western society blame hormones and genetics, a view perpetuated by the medical community. However, feminists have challenged this view, contending that there are other societal and structural factors that play into the higher rates of depression in women. We argue that the particular pressure that communities place on women to fill the stereotypical role of feminine, ‘good’ woman can lead to the observed higher rates. Other stereotypes about women, especially how women deal with their emotions, what emotions are acceptable for women to display, and  historical understandings of hysteria further tie women and mental illness together. Due to these connections, we must critically examine the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM)’s criteria for depression and ask if the symptoms identified are truly gender neutral. Understanding the interplay between stereotypes and mental illness leads us to question the objectivity of science: due to the potential for individual scientists to incorporate their personal gender biases into their work and the power that science has in defining normality, we conclude that analyzing depression from a purely biological perspective means missing other factors that can influence depression and rates of depression diagnosis. In order to understand the influence of gender upon depression, we must analyze how science, stereotypes and mental illness are connected.
            As an illness with ties to other disorders like anxiety and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, growing rates of depression have worried mental health professionals and have lead to inclusion of its symptoms in the DSM (Bueskens 2011). Depressive episodes are characterized by: “a depressed mood most of the day”; “diminished interest and pleasure in all our most activities”; “feelings of worthlessness and excessive guilt”; “agitation or psychomotor retardation”; and other symptoms relating to weight and sleep pattern changes (“Managing Depressive Symptoms”). Although these symptoms are not restricted to certain genders, the “experience” of depression may be different: while women “report higher levels of anxiety, sleep troubles, and physical problems”, men are more disposed to ‘ignoring depressive symptoms”, through continual involvement in enjoyed activities or abuse of drugs and alcohol (Bueskens 2011). The experience and prevalence of depression is also altered by factors of race, age, and location.  Although the average rate is one in four women, rates vary widely between various groups and depend on whether or not men are included: for example, three percent of the general Japanese population feel depressed at some point in their life, compared to about seventeen percent of Americans (Jacquot & Knack 2009).
            Popular perceptions of the causes of depression center mainly on genetic and biological factors. The National Institute of Mental Health’s website about depression highlights these elements under the “Causes” section of their webpage. The NIMH is a government organization that supports research on and education about mental health issues and their website presents itself as a resource for people who want to know more about various disorders. Their page on depression includes the subtopics “What is Depression,” “Causes,” “Signs and Symptoms,” “Who is at Risk?,” “Diagnosis,” “Treatments,” “Living With,” and “Clinical Trials” (“Depression”). Under each heading, the organization adopts an educational and medical stance on the topics. Under the “Causes” section, the organization states that “depressive illnesses are disorders of the brain” and goes on to discuss magnetic resonance imaging and genetics research. It includes two brief sentences at the end of the section about how a stressful “trigger” such as a traumatic life event may bring on an episode of depression, though that there is not always a trigger. The main focus of the NIMH in regards to depression is on how biological factors affect mental health. They explicitly state that “longstanding theories about depression suggest that important neurotransmitters—chemicals that brain cells use to communicate—are out of balance in depression” and offer that theory as an explanation to the public, along with the theory that women might experience depression more often than men because of “the cyclical rise and fall of estrogen and other hormones” (“Depression”).
            This focus on biological causes is also evident on the NIMH page entitled “Women and Depression: Discovering Hope.” The organization dedicates an entire webpage to depression in women, devoting a large portion of the page to the various causes of depression they consider important specifically for women, which are “Genetics,” “Chemicals and Hormones,” “Premenstrual Dysphoric Disorder,” “Postpartum Depression,” “Menopause,” and “Stress.” Here again, the institute primarily discusses biological and hormonal related explanations for depression, focusing on the possibility that a family history of depression can increase risk for development and the way that hormones change drastically around life events exclusive to women, like menopause and pregnancy. These hormone changes may affect the way that the brain works, which is another area of research (“Women and…”). Even under the “Stress” heading, the website discloses that it is unknown why traumatic events trigger depression in some women but not others. Furthermore, this section mentions that “additional work and home responsibilities” contribute to stress that women may feel, but fails to connect these responsibilities to expectations for women: the idea that these extra stresses and expectations are directly a result of being a woman, rather than isolated instances, is where we begin our analysis. Overall, the page focuses on biological factors specific to women that the NIMH claim to be the most relevant causes of depression.
The focus on hormones and biology as primary sources for depression is not constrained only to this government website: an analysis of a popular advertisement for the antidepressant Cymbalta reveals the same sorts of claims. In the television commercial a woman’s body is displayed on screen with a glowing central nervous system while the narrator explains how the drug “works on serotonin and norepinephrine,” two hormones connected with mood (“Cymbalta…” 2011). Within the advertisement, no mention is given of other causes or contributors to depression (unsurprising, given that the goal of commercials is to sell their particular product). Given the authority of a government organization and constant exposure to advertisements from pharmaceutical companies, popular perceptions of depression in women are shaped by the two sources discussed here:

(Figure 1: Cymbalta Ad) The visual of a body’s nervous system and brain being changed by these chemicals emphasizes the importance of hormones in causing depression.

Instead of focusing on the biological basis for depression, feminist scholars often concentrate on structural and societal factors when exploring the possible reasons for the disparity between rates of depression in men and women. Beyond factors like poverty and abuse that disproportionately affect women and can contribute to rates of depression (Bueskens 2011), a pervasive cause that affects all women is society’s expectation of women to fill a stereotypical role. As doctors, researchers, and the public increasingly choose to look at depression on a case-by-case basis rather than as an overarching, society-plaguing problem with patterns, they “individualize” depression (Clarke 2007, 366). As a result, Clarke states, the biological understanding of depression advanced by medical profession overlooks the power dynamics and gender roles that affect depression and cause women to suffer from the illness at higher rates. Clarke observed a support group for women with depression and came to the conclusion, after analyzing what the women said and how the community atmosphere helped them, that while biological factors can contribute to experiencing depression, there are many other factors at play, which are succinctly summarized in the following figure.  

(Figure 2: Clarke 370)

While Clarke finds that “individual factors,” including biological elements, play a role in depression, they are just one part of the whole picture: the largest, unifying category that connects all women is called “society” and contains the expectations of femininity that lead to the many destructive stereotypes about women. Clearly, according to Clarke, there are overarching, structural aspects of society that cause women to be more likely to experience depression than men.
            Two other feminist scholars, Josephine Tan and Patricia M. Ulbrich explore this idea through two specific feminine stereotypes. Tan looks specifically at the ideal of women being non-confrontational and selfless and makes similar arguments to those of Clarke in her article, “Self-Silencing, Anger, and Depressive Symptoms in Women”. The central tenet of Tan’s argument is that the higher rates of depression in women are “because of their greater tendency to self-silence in intimate relationships in order to preserve harmony and the relationship and to adhere to the traditional female role” (Tan 2008, 6). “Self-silencing” refers to the idea that women tend to hide their true feelings from others, leading to “feelings of anger and self-condemnation that can lead to heightened vulnerability for depression in some women” (Tan 2008, 6). One stereotype of women is that they not get upset or angry and “self-silencing” satisfies this societal expectation, through women not expressing this anger. In the study she conducted, Tan discovered that the women experiencing the most severe forms of depression were most likely to report “greater anger expression, anger suppression and self-silencing” (Tan 2008, 13), indicating that they were more likely to have hidden their true feelings of anger from others until they eventually had to express that anger. The study discusses how the women who experienced more severe depression “ascribed more to the traditional female sex role” (Tan 2008, 13) by attempting to be the ultimate, caring, selfless wife and/or mother. These women were deeply affected by the expectations of society (indicated by Clarke) that they be caring, non confrontational, and passive and consequently, felt greater distress when they perceived themselves as failing to fit their prescribed role. Tan stresses that more attention should be paid to the structural factors that contribute to depression in women specifically and investigates the influence of such factors on depression by working with one particular female stereotype.
            The stereotype that Ulbrich addresses through her study differs from Tan’s: her examination of two income marriages connects to the image of women as dependent on men..   In her article “The Determinants of Depression in Two-Income Marriages”, Ulbrich investigates how women (and men) in two-income marriages react to the ‘nontraditional’ family structure in which they participate. Although the general attitude of society towards this issue at this time of this study (1988) was probably less progressive than it is now, the idea that women’s work is less valuable is still prevalent in current society and so Ulbrich’s work is still relevant. She discusses the reality of how men often resent the fact that their wives work and studied several particular factors in each observed marriage: “husband’s attitude toward wife’s employment, husband’s perceived attitude, and wife’s orientation to work” (Ulbrich 1988, 126). This study concluded that, for women who had low earnings, their husbands tended to oppose their employment and they also had higher instances of depression, which indicates that the value of women leaving their traditional place at home is determined by their earnings and that the husbands opinions on the wife’s employment affected the wife’s mental health. The most important factor, however, that Ulbrich determined in predicting depression in women was level of education, a factor closely correlated with social status: it appears from her study that women of higher social status had husbands who supported their employment. From this, we can understand how the topic of depression in women is an intersectional issue and how feminists choosing to look at it through various lens and taking into account various social and power structures helps gain a better understanding of how certain stereotypes are applied to certain women. Ulbrich’s work illustrates how women are expected to be the passive subjects at the bottom of the social hierarchy, something that not all women want to be. As seen in these three studies, depression often stems from women conforming to expectations unhappily. Society puts massive amounts of pressure on women to be “feminine” which often means being a caretaker, being subservient to a man, and being able to gracefully handle all responsibilities without making a fuss. This pressure is so strong that even if a woman wants to deny these expectations, society has ways to force them, by humiliation or rejection, to comply.
Stereotypes continue to be important factors not only in cases of depression, but also within understandings of mental disorders: feminists have analyzed the history of mental illnesses and the criteria used to evaluate them, arguing that psychoanalysis has historically focused on women and that symptoms associated with many disorders are connected with ideals and stereotypes of femininity. As a result of this conceptualization of mental disorders, women have been inclined to be diagnosed with such an illness at much higher rates.  In Hystories, Elaine Showalter traces the history of ‘hysteria’, a term that “throughout most of its medical history...has been associated with women” (Showalter 1997, 15).  Although the term hysteria would not be found in the DSM today, “many of its traditional symptoms were reclassified as anxiety neuroses, obsessional disorders, manic depression, or borderline personality disorders” (Showalter 1997, 17).  As scientists in the eighteenth to twentieth century attempted to discern the causes of hysteria, these male professionals often blamed female reproductive organs and identified symptoms of this illness as stereotypical qualities of females (Showalter 1997, 15-17, 21, 33). For example, Charcot defined hysterics as those who were “vain and preoccupied with their appearance, deceitful and self-dramatizing”, all traits associated with women (Showalter 1997, 34).  More concerning though are the political dimensions of this connection of femininity and hysteria: Showalter states that “doctors viewed hysterical women as closet feminists who had to be reprogrammed into traditional roles, and politicians attacked feminists activists as closet hysterics who needed treatment rather than rights” (Showalter 1997, 49). As women continue to be diagnosed more often with mental illness, accusations of madness will continue to threaten women’s claims and arguments. Although many of the pioneers Showalter discusses have passed away and the medical profession has moved on, their findings and prejudices continue to be powerful; Sigmund Freud, possibly the most famous psychoanalyst in history, “relied on cultural myths of masculine and feminine identity in shaping his interpretation of hysteria” (Showalter 1997, 44). As long as the stereotypes associated with gender continue to affect those in charge of shaping diagnostic criteria, the association of women and madness will be perpetuated.
Furthermore, feminists continue to critique the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual for Mental Disorders, arguing that it both ignores external, societal factors as the causes of illness and that a gender bias is evident in the symptoms linked to many of the disorders.  Feminists have realized that as the DSM is revised, “the biomedical view has become more firmly entrenched, reducing the stated influence of social and psychological theories on the causes of mental illness” (Becker 2001, 336). This trend is problematic: in the case of depression, we have already observed how an individual’s experiences and the expectations placed upon them can affect their likelihood of developing depression. Other mental illnesses have also been connected with external events or influences that cannot be accounted for through a purely biological perspective.  An understanding of mental illness as purely internal also risks “[denying] the very real social problems that women face” (Becker 2001, 336), a problem that is connected with the historical practice of “[ridiculing] and [trivializing] women’s medical and political complaints” (Showalter 1997, 8). Again, the political and social power of associating women and mental illness is evident.
            Through analyzing current critiques of diagnostic criteria for several other disorders more commonly seen in women, we can work to scrutinize the DSM guidelines for depression.  As the DSM has been revised and reshaped, continual appeals for certain disorders to be redefined or to be taken out entirely have had varying levels of success. Premenstrual dysphoric disorder (PMDD) is still included within the DSM, despite outcries from feminist that “the institutionalization of a natural female bodily function as a mental disorder” contributes to the idea of women as “mad” (Becker 2001, 335). In other cases, like those of several personality disorders, feminists push for diagnostic criteria to be changed due to the gender bias incorporated into the terminology and symptoms used within the DSM. Masochistic personality disorder (also known as self-defeating personality disorder) has been a site of controversy, as feminists argue “against labeling some women disordered when they display the same selfless, self-abnegating behaviors widely encouraged in the socialization of girls” (Becker 2001, 335). Women are expected to defer to others’ wishes, be kind and act courteous, while men are not typically associated with these traits; consequently, women more often have to suffer the stigmatization of being labeled with this mental illness. Considering Dependent Personality Disorder (DPD), a similar issue arises; feminists have observed that “the criteria of DPD exclude the kinds of stereotyped expressions of male dependency that may be expressed in jealous, controlling behavior”, and rely upon symptoms of dependency typical of women (Becker 2001, 339). Not only does this bias reflect dependency as “unhealthy” in women, but the example of DPD also reinforces the consequences of ignoring external influences and trivializing women’s complaints. Becker states that current definitions of DPD encourage the idea that “when [dependency] is expressed in an extreme form in women it primarily reflects dysfunction, as opposed to reflecting the actual power differences between men and women that may contribute to dependent behaviors in some women” (Becker 2001, 339). There are real consequences to this gender bias: being diagnosed with a mental illness (including ones like Borderline Personality Disorder, that are more often found in women) can lead to being discredited in judicial settings, being stripped of the ability to make decisions about your body, and being subject to the stigma associated with disability (Becker 2001, 341). Gender bias and stereotypes found in the DSM is connected to historical understandings of women as ‘hysterical’ and continues to shape political and social impressions of women.
            Judith Butler, in her work, “Performative Acts and Gender Constitution,” introduces the idea that gender is constructed through the repetition of certain acts. She asserts that “gender identity is a performative accomplishment compelled by social sanction and taboo” (Butler 520). Feminists believe that the different genders are not automatically present at birth, but that society imposes them upon us and punishes us through a variety of means if we do not comply. There are two points relating to Butler’s work that we would like to make in our discussion of the higher rate of depression in women than in men. The first comes in when analyzing the feminist scholars’ arguments about how societal pressures lead women to become depressed. We believe what they mean is that they have been sanctioned, as Butler would describe it, and feel that they cannot act the way they would like. Due to the necessity of complying with certain gender norms, women feel the need to perform in a certain way and, in turn, suppress their true desires. This suppression caused by societal pressures is, the scholars say, a factor in causing depression in women. Both in simply observing the world around us and in looking at Clarke, Tan, and Ulbrich’s research, it is not difficult to see the various ways that women have to perform their gender in certain ways and possibly forego some desires or behaviors that diverge from the standard. In the case of causing depression, many women experiencing the illness attribute it to having to live up to expectations. We think that one woman in Clarke’s study put it best:
‘Part of being depressed is obviously how you feel about yourself but that also comes from society . . . me thinking I have to be thin, I have to have a boyfriend, I have to have a family. Part of me feeling happy is me realising that I don’t have to do any of that ... I’m ok as who I am ... having clarity about what makes me happy . . . skills to be comfortable in my own skin.’ (Clarke 2007, 376)
The woman who made this comment is really talking about how society expects her to perform her gender in a certain way, i.e. by “[having] a boyfriend” or “[having] a family,” which are considered socially acceptable ways to express femininity.
The second point we would like to highlight pertains to the gender bias in the DSM criteria for diagnosing depression. If men and women are socialized to perform their genders in certain and divergent ways, as Butler argues that they do, then why would their expressions of depression be the same? It makes sense that men often will not fit into the diagnostic criteria because they, in most cases, would have been punished for revealing the emotions necessary for a diagnosis (while women are often socialized to display more emotionality and, thus, would fit the criteria when facing depression). In western society, men are expected to be brave and strong and unwavering, not emotional. The DSM requires certain factors to exist for a diagnosis of depression, and it might simply not be recognized in men if they do not outwardly express these factors. However, the reason for the phenomenon of men not expressing these factors might not be that they are not experiencing depression, but that their expression of it is different from how it is outlined in the DSM because they have been socialized not to act certain ways. It is not that men never feel “worthless” or “guilty,” (“Managing Depressive Symptoms”) diagnostic criteria set forth by the DSM, but that they might not express these feelings in the same way as women and thus might not be diagnosed with depression.
Understanding the potential for bias within DSM criteria for depression leads us to a better appreciation for the influence of the medical community and biological sciences upon our daily lives, but also brings up the uncomfortable reality of the amount of authority society gives them. Despite the power given to science, it does not objectively capture the whole picture of how our bodies and minds work: the ‘truths’ of science are affected by scientist’s individual biases and opinions and shape what is considered normal within society. The medical community has perpetuated traditional gender roles and behaviors, not only in the arena of mental disorders, but also in narratives describing the reproductive process. In “The Egg and the Sperm”, Emily Martin chronicles the continual association of a female’s egg with passivity and the male’s sperm with aggression despite new evidence that the egg plays an active role in reproduction; although research has indicated that previous understandings of reproduction were flawed, “researchers who made [this] discovery continued to write papers and abstracts as if the sperm were the active party who attacks, binds, penetrates, and enters the egg” (Martin 1991, 493). Instead of science operating in an objective space, “the picture of egg and sperm drawn in popular as well as scientific accounts of reproductive biology relies on stereotypes central to our cultural definitions of male and female” (Martin 1991, 485). How the egg and sperm function reflects back upon female and males’ own gender performitivity: the stereotypes associated with gender are transferred to the act of conception and the language describing it changes as a result. Similarly, in the case of the DSM, the language describing symptoms of depression (especially the focus emotions and moods) reflects the influence of gender roles upon science and emphasizes that the biases of the people who write the books and manuals affects everyone’s understanding: as women are expected to perform their gender by being emotional and if these symptoms are the only ones listed, depression and other mental illnesses will only be identified in women. Future research is also affected as standard manuals like the DSM “[set] out a template for new knowledge that shapes which scientific questions will be asked and which will be overlooked” (Becker 2001, 336). Recognizing and working to end acceptance of gender stereotypes within the scientific community will have an effect on future scientific investigations, which is vital if we hope to end the association of women and mental disorders.
            Furthermore, the ability of science to rewrite normality and acceptable behavior has consequences for all. By defining increasing numbers of behaviors as indicators of a mental illness, we risk viewing “problems of living and the distress associated with them...as diseases rather than as behavior that is transactional or socially deviant” (Becker 2001, 334). Showalter also asks “Can we redefine hysteria in a way that allows more space for the mysteries of human emotions?” (Showalter 1997, 11).  Science is another part of our culture which assists in characterizing normality which in turn influences stereotypes. In “The Sex/Gender Perplex”, Anne Fausto-Sterling provides a history of the classification and understanding of intersex individuals to argue that both sex and gender are constructed. Since such individuals display internal and external signs characteristic of both males and females, doctors did and continue to “base their assessment of sexual identity on the overall shape of the body and the inclination of the patient” (Fausto-Sterling 200, 640) and if the patient’s body falls outside what is considered normal, surgery ensues. The decision of assigning a male or female sex is not purely based upon scientific understandings: when identifying a child as female, “despite published medical information showing a range of clitoral size at birth, doctors may use only their personal impressions to decide that a baby’s clitoris is ‘too big’ to belong to a girl and must be downsized” (Fausto-Sterling 200, 644). Thus, normality for a certain gender can be shaped by individual doctors with their own biases; this conclusion can be extended to our understanding of mental disorders as well. Mental illness is a way of marking behaviors or thoughts as ‘wrong’ and through constituting incorrect behaviors (or gender performances) as symptoms of a disorder, the medical profession marks certain behaviors as right. This, in turn, shapes our societal understanding of stereotypes for each gender and discredits those who fall outside the ‘right’ parameters. As we investigate mental disorders, we must be cognizant of the impact of defining these illnesses on everyday conceptions of normality and the effects on individuals who do not fit into those representations.
            In order to gain a more comprehensive understanding of depression and its higher prevalence among women, feminists must continue to investigate and popularize the other societal and structural factors that contribute to its development and bring to light the severe consequences of enforcing strict gender stereotypes. Interested individuals must be wary of how gender stereotypes affect the diagnostic criteria used to evaluate patients and must consider this bias within their research. By connecting gender stereotypes to women’s depression experiences, historical and current definitions of mental illness, and science’s ability to constitute normality, we can begin to understand the complex ways that gender interacts with society and stereotypes. Becker states: “When human problems are viewed as illnesses, the values, beliefs, and politics that influence clinicians when they make diagnoses are concealed behind the mask of a purportedly neutral and objective science” (Becker 2001, 335). In order to determine some sort of truth about what depression is, and if it truly affects women at higher rates due to biology, gender stereotypes, or for structural reasons, we must uncover this mask and critically analyze the institutions and professions that define it.



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Femme Bashing and the Masculine Ideal


Abjection of the Feminine: Effeminophobia and the Construction of Gay Masculinities
 by Betrearon Tezera

Is every kind of man equally extended in society, or are there particular kinds of men deemed more favorable for social endorsement? Peter Jackson reminds us that “certain forms of masculinity…achieve a virtual hegemony [in contemporary society]” (201). Furthermore, the proliferation of hegemonic masculinity is achieved by explicitly “privileging certain socially-approved [embodiments of masculinity, most notably]…exclusive heterosexuality” (Jackson 201). Indeed, as dominant (hegemonic) masculinity relates to homosexual men, it insists on the figuration of the gay male body as “deviant and dangerous” (Jackson 201). For the purposes of brevity, and achieving a truly incisive analysis, this paper will focus on the differential valuation of masculinities within post-Stonewall (1969) gay male enclaves in the United States, with the understanding that, even within the bounds of a generally disprized social group, certain masculinities are valorized at the expense of others (Emily Kane 54). So, to refine our driving question, is every kind of gay man equally extended in “gay social spaces?” By utilizing various literatures in sociology, anthropology, sexuality studies, and cultural studies, this paper aims to assert that effeminate gay men hold a particularly marginalized position within US LGBT social and political spaces. Furthermore, in combination with the rejection of the feminine in the relegation of effeminate homosexual men, I aim to argue that, within said gay male enclaves, the obsessive need to achieve hegemonic ideals of masculinity reduces the queer political potential non-normative gender expressions and sexualities purportedly promise, a potential that, if fully realized, could have significant positive implications for the social, political, economic, and cultural valuation of effeminate gay men in the United States.
In Families We Choose: Lesbians, Gays, Kinship, Kath Weston reminds us that homosexual subjectivities “structured [themselves as] possibilities…for self-identified lesbians and gay men in the United States,” when the Stonewall Riots of June 1969 took place in New York City, effectively “birthing an [official] gay movement” (44). The significance of the Stonewall Riots in organizing the thesis of this paper thus becomes self-evident. Indeed, Weston asserts that, as a consequence of the Stonewall Riots, publicly declaring a homosexual identity, a process referred to as coming out, became “a strategy designed to gain political power and promote self-respect,” an assertion most profusely valorized by American gay icon Harvey Milk, the first openly gay city supervisor of San Francisco (47). But while this “moment of inception” of the modern gay movement in the United States is often cited as one of the greatest humanist strides of contemporary times, it is not exempt from the intrusive doctrines of hegemonic masculinity, a critical example of which, as Emily Kane reminds us, quoting sociologist Michael Kimmel, is “the notion of anti-femininity, [which] lies at the heart of contemporary…constructions of manhood, so that masculinity is defined more by what one is not rather than who one is” (54). Contextualizing this tenet of hegemonic masculinity, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick notes that “the official gay movement has never been quick to attend to issues concerning effeminate boys” (20). Sedgwick provides a workable definition of effeminophobia here, in addressing the reality that the modern gay movement often “turns away” from the needs of gay men in its wake who do not embody ideals of hegemonic masculinity; she notes that the modern gay movement has as an implicit requisite the “relative de-emphasis of the links between gay adults and gender non-conforming children” (Sedgwick 20). While this de-emphasis has been crucial to the treatment of gender expression and sexual object choice as distinct and non-collapsible conceptions, the danger, as relating to the effeminate gay male, is that “the effeminate boy [comes to occupy] the position of the haunting abject…of gay thought itself;…the eclipse of the effeminate boy from adult gay discourse [represents] a damaging theoretical gap” (Sedgwick 20). To ignore the specter of the effeminate gay male, whether child or adult, is to belie the reality that “[gay men] have a…history of self-perceived [or externally ascribed] effeminacy, femininity, and non-masculinity,” and the grave illogicality of utilizing “internalized homophobic hatred” in order to reify “gay-affirmative analyses” (Sedgwick 21).
Deploying Sedgwick’s sentiments, I propose here that the modern gay movement is held hostage by effeminophobia; more specifically, it is constricted in its queer political possibilities by what can be called the “figure of the sissy.” glbtq, the Encyclopedia of Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer Culture, defines the term “sissy” as “a term for an effeminate male,…used as a disparaging term for boys who behave like girls;” indeed, the term “serves as a kind of social control to enforce ‘gender appropriate’ behavior” (Hayes and Summers). The origins of the term are debated, but American popular culture figures it as a maligned iteration of the word “sister.” But a more intriguing etiology of the term is furthered by glbtq, an origin related to “the American Psychological Association’s (APA) voting to remove homosexuality’s categorization as a mental illness,” implementing, in its place, “Gender Identity Disorder in Childhood, also known as ‘Sissy Boy Syndrome’” (Hayes and Summers). The sissy then mobilizes, as Hayes and Summers would put it, “yet another attempt to pathologize gender variant behavior.” Interestingly, the figure of the sissy, as an ideological figuration, is reminiscent of what Judith Butler calls “the situation of duress under which gender performance always and variously occurs;” it is important to remember here that, as a result of Butler’s seminal work in feminist and gender theories, it is generally accepted within academic and activist discourses that gender is “a performative [identity],… an identity instituted through a stylized repetition of acts” (519). In this sense, then, the figure of the sissy comes to represent not just a milieu of “duress” that subtends the performance of gender, but a means of instituting “punitive consequences” for “those who fail to do their gender right” as well (Butler 522).
In this sense, the figure of the sissy becomes a convenient means of enforcing hegemonic masculinity, particularly considering gay male enclaves. As Kane reminds us, hegemonic masculinity has as its features such tenets as “aggression, limited emotionality, and heterosexuality” (54). This view is corroborated by Hayes and Summers, as they assert that “many boys [who are called “sissies” as a result of self-initiated or ascribed feminine expressions] consciously attempt [as a result of the derisive power of the figure of the sissy] to redirect their interests…toward stereotypically masculine interests.” In this manner, what I propose as the figure of the sissy is intimately related to what C.J. Pascoe calls the “specter of the ‘fag.’” (329). As does Sedgwick, Pascoe reminds us that “the ‘fag’ position is an ‘abject’ position and…a ‘threatening specter;’” indeed, the “fag” asserts itself as “[a means of] constituting contemporary American…masculinity, [actualized by] the repudiation of this abjected identity” (333). Arguably, then, both the specter of the “fag” and the figure of the “sissy” are “infused with regulatory power,” such that the consolidation of a “coherent” American masculinity requires the rejection of any performative repetition of femininity, what can be called “the subordination of non-hegemonic masculinities” (Pascoe 333; Kane 54).
But, in addition to instilling the notion of the “sissy” as a means of social (and self-) policing in my theoretical framework, I would also like to propose that we read the figure of the “sissy” as an illustration of what Sara Ahmed calls proximity and its resultant disgust, “the inter-corporeal encounter of incorporation” through which we harbor “disgust” as a reaction to “objects and subjects” interacting to form “impressions, or how objects impress upon us,…[the] affect of one surface upon another” (83, 6). Indeed, further relating this formation to the figure of the “sissy,” “Ahmedian” disgust is not merely the act of rejecting or repudiating this figure, for “disgust is deeply ambivalent, involving desire for, or an attraction towards, the very objects that are felt to be repellent…‘even as the disgusting repels, it rarely does so without capturing our attention’” (Ahmed 84; William Miller, quoted in Ahmed 84).
It is in the frisson between deep attraction and acute repulsion that Ahmed locates what she calls queer discomfort: “[this is] a discomfort which is generative…[a discomfort] not about assimilation (attraction) or resistance (repulsion), but about inhabiting norms differently…the inhabitance is generative…insofar as it [represents] possibilities of living that do not ‘follow’ these norms through” (155). Here, we can begin to construct a functional elucidation of the queer, and more precisely, why gay male “assimilationist” attempts to realize hegemonic masculinity have decidedly de-queering effects. Supplementing Ahmed’s insistence that we critically question, and eventually move beyond, an oppositional figuration of societal norms, Lee Edelman reminds us that “queerness can never define an identity; it can only ever disturb one…the burden of queerness is to be located less in the assertion of an oppositional political identity than in opposition to politics as the governing fantasy of realizing” (17). Combining Ahmedian queer discomfort and an Edelmanian notion of queerness as a disidentification from the hegemonic understanding that politics is necessarily driven by the reification of oppositional norms, I suggest a definition of queerness such that to be queer is to disidentify with oppositional politics, while anticipating that such a release from hegemonic organizations of political participation will afford alleged sexual and gender “dissidents” an inclusive, empowering orientation to the respective milieus within which they exist. It becomes evident, then, that the contemporary gay male’s obsession with achieving hegemonic masculinity (at the expense of effeminacy) is less queer because it insists on interacting with an oppositional political order within which, as Kane reminds us, “masculinity [is emphasized by] its relational opposition to femininity,” within a social order that, as it currently stands, “can neither fully articulate nor acknowledge [queerness]” (Kane 54; Edelman 26).
Utilizing this framework, how might we read anthropological and sociological evidence in which hegemonic masculinity becomes a prized performance? Can we begin to suggest a queer-feminist alternative to hegemonic masculinity, and more importantly, to the insistence that hegemonic masculinity occupy its dominance by repudiating the figure of the “sissy?” I would like to use the remainder of this paper to further my attempt at answering these and other related questions.
Kittiwut Taywaditep’s examination of contemporary American gay subculture offers perhaps one of the most insightful ventures in elucidating hegemonic masculinity, particularly as it relates to the ways in which gay men who embody non-hegemonic masculinities experience punitive consequences; for instance, the reality that “effeminate gay men [are]…predisposed to…[psychological] problems…such as low self-esteem and poor psychological adjustment [due to] marginalization [via] constant [social] rejection” (Taywaditep 11). Indeed, exploring an array of historical materials evidencing the progression of the gay movement, particularly George Chauncey’s exploration of (white) gay life in New York, he observes that “hypermasculine sensibilities announced a new masculine gay identity [through rejecting] the ‘limp-wristed swish’ stereotype of…previous eras” (Taywaditep 7, 9). This hypermasculine ideal, corresponding comfortably with doctrines of hegemonic masculinity, “became highly visible in gay men’s aesthetics, fashions, recreation, and erotica” (Taywaditep 9). We begin to observe, then, that the valorization of hegemonic masculinity within gay male enclaves (and indeed, in broader society) is representationally achieved, and supported by capitalist constructs which are invariably in conversation with doctrines of (hetero)sexualized masculinity and the accumulation of value and markets, regardless of the ways in which individual consumers of representations of hegemonic masculinity identify in terms of sexual object choice; as Ahmed reminds us, “it is important not to identify [homosexuality] as outside the global economy, which transforms ‘pleasures’ into ‘profits’ by exploiting the labors of others” (163). But perhaps the most useful observation Taywaditep makes is his incisive comparison of the hypermasculine gay figure and the effeminate gay figure as potential embodiments of what he calls the rage of oppression: “effeminacy acknowledges the rage of being oppressed in defiance; [gay men’s] macho denies that there is rage and oppression [at all]” (11). Indeed, one could even figure the “macho” as “[a set of] values which are architects of closeted lives…adopting that style is the opposite of awareness” (Taywaditep 11). In addition to reminding us that gendered self-expressions are achieved through “stylized repetitions,” as is aforementioned, Taywaditep’s analysis is also in dialogue with Ahmed’s call to embrace queer discomfort as a source of enlightenment and emancipation, where his valorization of “awareness” could be compared to the tenuous yet generative space of neither assimilating to, nor rejecting, norms, but rather, embodying an awareness of one’s social position in the present moment, which is perhaps the most immediate explanation as to how and why effeminate gay men come to understand (and wrathfully interrogate) the fallacy of gender and, more importantly, the fallacy of hegemonic masculinity, for “gender is…a construction that [is realized through] the tacit agreement to perform, produce, and sustain discrete and polar genders as cultural fictions [where]…the construction compels one’s beliefs in its necessity and naturalness” (Butler 522).
It is productive here to explore further the potential manifestations of what Taywaditep figures as “effeminate rage,” where it could be argued that this rage is also an example of radical queerness, where the varied stings and wounds of perpetually oppressive social constructs converge to inspire the “sissy” to reject the social order’s impertinent and often unattainable demands. Just how does one channel a rage that has the potential to overtake one’s life and livelihood, to fuel a measured and effectively subversive presence? Perhaps an example of this is observed in Jamie Coy, Lynsey Goddard, and Jack Kahn’s analysis of the ways in which drag performances (in this paper, defined as the caricaturing of stereotypically feminine affectations by male-identified bodies) can provide a potential arena within which a successful sabotaging of hegemonic masculinity can take place. In examining the private and professional lives of performers at the Theatre Offensive, a non-profit organization dedicated to providing “’activist-based artistic forums’ promoting creative programs in queer culture,” Coy, Goddard, and Kahn concentrate on drag performers whose subversive attachment to drag performance can be seen as a template for queer intellectual, activist, and artistic investments (142). Indeed, these performers, in addition to displaying the “traditional” and socially recognizable drag repertoire, also “defy traditional drag norms by portraying female-bodied characters in less than flattering and/or stereotypically feminine ways…[often consistently refusing to] hide embodied male characteristics [like genitals and facial hair]” (Coy, Goddard, and Kahn 142). This embodiment, an uncanny and often “grotesque” embodiment at that, is apt in furthering an understanding of gender and sexuality, in which Sedgwick’s “de-emphasis” of the specter of the childhood “sissy” in articulating contemporary adult gay male discourses is critically interrogated. The performers of the Theatre Offensive begin to productively collapse some of the assumptions the contemporary gay movement has imbued itself with, regarding the apparent mutual exclusivity of gender expression and sexual object choice. In short, these performers refuse to “box themselves into a particular aesthetic,” to consciously choose to not engage with normativizing demands on their gendered performances of drag (Coy, Goddard, and Kahn 142). Theatre Offensive shows here the ways in which, as subjects, consumers of these performances can be “acted upon” by the “grotesque” object that is the “unrefined” drag queen, and as Ahmed reminds us, can be influenced positively by the “ambivalent disgust” they may experience in the course of such keenly subversive performances. But while Theatre Offensive represents potentially queer correctives to hegemonic masculinity, these correctives nevertheless arise in platforms with significant cultural and political cache, with an understanding of, and an absorption into, American historical and popular culture, pervaded by the presence of the white, gay, middle to upper-class male subject.
Ernesto Vasquez del Aguila reminds us that a majority of literature on queer theory, particularly involving hegemonic masculinity, has been produced with the white (particularly, Anglo-Saxon) middle to upper-class gay male in mind (209). But what might our examination of hegemonic masculinity reveal if we were to examine non-white American men who have sex with men (MSM)? This is precisely what Vasquez del Aguila achieves, in his examination of the lives Peruvian-born MSM lead in New York City, considered by many scholars to be a gay “epicenter,” a geographical region where gay life and gay culture proliferate significantly (207). Vasquez del Aguila reminds us that, in such gay epicenters, “white people [are] the hegemonic and desired race, while other ethnic and racial groups are relegated to subordinate positions” (210). But, while “white middle class [men] are more likely to be associated with…[subversive] gay identities,” Vasquez del Aguila’s intersectional analysis of Peruvian MSM in New York City suggests that this particular subset of gay men has its own strategies of navigating the strictures of hegemonic masculinity (209). In a Latin American immigrant context, Vasquez del Aguila asserts that “those [Peruvian-American gay men] who perform as ‘straight gays’ increase their masculine capital…[and] dilute ‘doubts’ about their homosexuality” (208). But while these men achieve some semblance of hegemonic masculinity by performing such tenets as “[manly] walking and speaking, proficiency in ‘male’ sports, [and] display and control of emotions,” they also “bend” the norms of hegemonic masculinity in important ways (Vasquez del Aguila 210). For instance, the caleta, in this expatriate gay community, represents “a man who has homoerotic experiences in total secrecy and discretion...., a man with a public heterosexual identity… [and] a secret homosexual life” (Vasquez del Aguila 210). In addition, many Peruvian-American gay men come out as “bisexual,” with the belief that “a bisexual identity….keeps alive their families’ ‘hope’ for a future ‘reconversion’ to a heterosexual life….bisexuals remain ‘masculine’ and their ability to penetrate other people is still intact” (Vasquez del Aguila 215). While these men represent a less grandiose challenge to hegemonic masculinity relative to Theatre Offensive, their embodied masculinities are more related to their need to navigate their existences than to the denigration and maligning of the effeminate gay male. In this manner, a certain queerness is realized, in that these men subvert hegemonic masculinity to the extent of mobilizing what Coy, Goddard, and Kahn call masculinity as strategy, where “[conventional] masculinity [becomes] a strategy for adaptive strategic action [in the realm of]…work, academic environments, and relationships” (145).
Eithne Luibheid, relying on Lisa Duggan’s work, reminds us that “concrete mechanisms” like hegemonic masculinity pervade our social milieus, mechanisms through which the homosexual male body is coopted “as a…figure complicit in the abandonment of broad-based social justice struggles in favor of incorporation [into hegemony] for a select few” (Luibheid 299, 307). Our objective is thus clear: we must continue, using the above and countless other examples as referential points of origin, to advocate for a radical queering of hegemonic masculinity, lest we come to serve hegemony as coopted social machinations working to achieve our own annihilation.

Works Cited
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